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In the zeal of officers charged with the investigatio'n of crime to
ferret out offenses and bring the perpetrators to justice, these officers
have in many years past engaged first in enticing persons to commit
crimes and then prosecuting them for the crime committed. This
practice is known as "entrapment", and the question raised in each
case is: does the act of the officer entitle the defendant to an acquittal
of the crime committed by him? The prevalence of this practice in
one field alone of law enforcement is shown by the statement made in
1927 by Judge Woodrough in United States v. Washington ' in which
he said, "As shown by the last report of the Attorney General there
were some 44,ooo liquor prosecutions brought in the federal courts
during the fiscal year, and if I may estimate the proportion of them
that are based on sales to agents [prohibition officers] by the cases
brought before me, it would seem that at least 30,000 of them are of
that kind." In view of the prevalence of the practice and of the confusion and inconsistencies in the decisions and in the theories on which
the decisions are based, it seems worth while to inquire into the history
and the principles governing entrapment as a defense to crime.
None of the English writers on criminal law, ancient or modern,
mentions entrapment as a defense to a charge of crime. Hale, East,
Hawkins, Stephen, Russell, Kenny, are silent in regard to it. It would
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seem that the practice was rare in England notwithstanding the zeal
and efficiency, or perhaps because of the efficiency, of "Scotland Yard",
or else that solicitation of a crime by an officer is regarded in the same
light as solicitation by a private person; the latter never having been
considered a defense unless it disproved the element of non-consent
necessary for the offense charged.2 Insofar as English and American
law is concerned, entrapment as an excuse.to a charge of crime seems
to be a purely American doctrine.
The life span of the doctrine of entrapment in the federal courts
is a short one, having its genesis in obiter. The first case in the federal courts which the writer has found in which this defense was considered is United States v. Whittier.3 The case did not involve entrapment by an officer, but by an agent of the Society for the Suppression
of Vice. It was decided not: on the ground of entrapment, but on the
ground that the defendant's acts did not bring hihn within the provisions of the statute under which he was indicted. The defense of
entrapment having been advanced, however, in the course of his
opinion, Judge Treat, concurring, said: "No case, after most diligent search has been found which disposes exactly of the point under
consideration. In my judgment, it must be settled in the light of
elemental principles-no court should, even to aid in detecting a supposed offender, lend its countenance to a violation of positive law, or
to contrivances for inducing a person to commit a crime. Although a
violation of law by one person in order to detect an offender will not
excuse the latter, or be available to him as a defense, yet resort to
unlawful means is not to be encouraged." 4 Several cases of entrapment followed 5 but in none of them was the defendant excused on
that ground, though the courts in dictum denounced the practice. It
was not until the case of Woo Wai v. United States 6 in 1915, that a
federal court decided that a defendant who had committed the crime
for which he was indicted was entitled to an acquittal on the ground
of entrapment. In this case an agent of the Immigration Commission
suspected, not the defendant, but certain officers of the Immigration
Commission of the unlawful importation of Chinese women into the
United States, and, believing that the defendant had information of
such transactions, and with the object of extorting such information
from him, to be used in convicting the suspected immigration officials,
2. The writer has found only one case in the English Reports in which entrapment
In this case the entrapwas employed, Regina v. Titley, 14 Cox C. C. 502 (88o).
ment was neither advanced as a defense, nor considered by the court.
3. 28 Fed. Cas 591, No. 16,688 (E. D. Mo. 1878).
4. Id. at 594.
5. United States v. Grimm, So Fed. 528 (E. D. Mo. 1892); United States v.
Adams, 59 Fed. 674 (D. C. Ore. 1894).
6. 223 Fed. 412 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915).
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employed a detective who persuaded the defendant to propose to immigration officials the illegal entry of Chinese. The defendant having
been convicted of conspiracy to violate the immigration laws, an appeal
was taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals.
The circuit court held that there were two grounds on which the
conviction should be reversed: first, that the facts did not prove a
conspiracy; second, "that a sound public policy can be upheld only by
denying the criminality of those who are thus induced to commit acts
which infringe the letter of criminal statutes." Six cases are cited in
support of the doctrine. While in all of the cases cited the court took
occasion to condemn the entrapment of persons into crime, in none of
them was the defendant held entitled to an acquittal because of entrapment by an officer. Two of these cases were convictions of burglary
in which the convictions were reversed on the ground that the owner
consented to the entry; 7 one on erroneous exclusion of evidence.8 In
another 9 the court held that the trial court did not err in refusing to
order an acquittal on the ground of entrapment. In another,' 0 a nisi
prius case, the entrapment was done by a private person; and in the
last "1it was held that the defendant's act did not bring him within the
spirit of the statutory provision under which he was indicted.
The subject of "entrapment" does not appear in any American
text book until the eighth edition of Wharton in 188o, in which he
says, entrapment is no defense, citing three federal cases,' 2 in none of
which, however, was the defense raised. No mention of the doctrine
is found in Bishop's treatise until the ninth edition, published in 1923.
In the tenth edition of Wharton, published in 1896, he says entrapment
is a defense, giving the curious reason, "the government is precluded
from asking that the offenders thus decoyed should be convicted. They
are associates with the government in the commission of the crime, and
the offense being joint, the prosecution must fail. If that which one
principal does is not a crime, the other principal cannot be convicted
for aiding him." '3
There is much conflict in the decisions and inconsistency in the
reasons for the decisions in entrapment cases. These begin with the
procedure by which the defense should be presented. This confusion
7. Love v. People, 16o Ill. 5o, 43 N. E. 710 (1896) ; People v. McCord, 76 Mich.
N. W. iio6 (1889).

2oo, 42

8. Saunders v. People, 38 Mich. 218 (1878).
9. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 42 Pa. Super. 38 (igio).
io. Commonwealth v. Bicldngs, 12 Pa. Dist. 2o6 (i9o3).
ii. O'Brien v. State, 6 Tex. App. 665 (1879).
12. United States v. Foye, 25 Fed. Cas. 1198, No. 15,157 (C. C. Mass. 1853);
United States v. Cottingham, 25 Fed. Cas. 673, No. 14,872 (C. C. N. D. N. Y., 1852) ;
United States v. Whittier, 28 Fed. Cas. 591, No. i6,688 (E. D. Mo. 1878), cited note
3 SUPra.
13. I WHARTON, CRImINAL LAW (Ioth ed. I896) i66.
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is the result of differences of theory on which the defense is based.
Some courts hold that entrapment is a defense only when, and because,
it proves that the defendant was not guilty of the offense charged;
hence the defense must be raised by a plea of not guilty. Others hold
that the defense may be raised by a motion to quash the indictment, by
a plea in bar, or that the court itself of its.own motion may, and indeed
should, where entrapment exists, stop the prosecution and set the
defendant at liberty, or free him on a writ of habeas corpus. In Sorrells v. United States,1 4 Mr. Justice Roberts, Mr. Justice Brandeis and
Mr. Justice Stone took the second view, and the remainder of the court,
with the exception of Mr. Justice McReynolds, who dissented, the first.
Passing from the procedure to the defense itself, we find the cases
in equal confusion. The most frequent definition of the doctrine of
entrapment in decisions prior to Sorrells v. United States is, that where
an officer charged with the investigation of crime, suspecting that a
certain person is engaged in the commission of crime, has made overtures of a certain kind (characterized variously in the definition) for
the commission of such crime to the defendant, and the defendant has
committed the crime because of such overtures, and would not have
committed it except for such overtures, the defendant is entitled to a
verdict of not guilty on the ground of entrapment. The cases assume
that the officer was acting in his official character and not to share in
the fruits of the crime. The conflicting results of the decisions on
this phase of the doctrine begin first with the different characterization
of the overture made by the officer to the defendant. Here one finds
the decisions turning on supposed distinctions between words of similar
meaning. Did the officer "solicit" the defendant to commit the crime,
or "instigate" its commission; did he "induce" the defendant to commit
it, or merely "lay a trap" for him; did he "decoy" the defendant into
the commission of the crime or did he "ensnare" him; did he "incite"
or "lure" him to commit it, or did the officer only "furnish facilities"
for its commission? On the supposed differences in meaning between
one or another of these expressions most of the decisions are based.
The different descriptive characterizations given to the act of the officer
by different judges as the test to determine the defendant's guilt (e. g.
"provokes", or "incites") and the different meaning given by different
judges to the act of the officer even when these different judges use
the same characterization of the act as the test, cause much conflict.
In United States v. Lynch ,i the act of the officer that will excuse the
defendant is characterized as one that "provokes or creates" the crime;
14. 287 U. S. 435 (1932).

15. 256 Fed. 983, 984 (S. D. N. Y. 19i8).
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in United States v. Echols1 6 it is one that "incites or induces and
lures"; in Garganov. United States 17 it is "induced"; and in Billingsley
v. United States 18 it is "inducing the original intent" and "enticing"
the defendant. In Ritter v. United States1 9 an instruction to the jury
that it was for them to determine whether the act of the officer was a
"fair decoy" or not was held "as fair to the accused as the law will
warrant."
In Strader v. United States 20 the court characterized the
act of the officer which would entitle the defendant to an acquittal as
a "decoy to ensnare" the defendant.
Not only do the courts differ in their characterization of the act of
the officer which will serve to excuse the defendant, but when they use
the same word to describe the nature of this act, for example the word
"instigation", one court will hold that an act of the officer "instigated"
the offense, a different court, and sometimes the same court in another
case, will hold an identical act not to have "instigated" the crime.
In Casey v. United States 21 Mr. Justice Holmes, who spoke for
the majority of the Court, said, "We do not feel at liberty to accept
the suggestion that the Government induced the crime," 22 and held
that the acts of the officer did not excuse the defendant; while Mr.
Justice Brandeis called the same act of the officer "instigation""the alleged crime was instigated by the officers of the Government" 23-- and stated that the doctrine of entrapment applied, and
that the defendant should be acquitted. On the differences in meaning given by judges and juries to these characterizations of the overtures made by the officer to the defendant, it comes about that on
practically identical operative facts the defense is held valid in one case
and denied in another, and the defendant held to be a criminal or an
"innocent victim". The confusion does not end here. Many of the
cases turn on whether or not the officer suspected or had grounds to
believe that the defendant was engaged in the commission of similar
crimes. 2 4 Yet Judge Woodrough says in United States v. Washington
that "Neither suspicion or honest belief that the defendant committed
the offense at other times has any place in the inquiry." 25 In other
cases it is held that evidence of grounds for such suspicion or belief is
16. 253 Fed. 862 (S. D. Tex. 1918).
17. 24 F. (2d) 625 (C. C. A. 5th, 1928).
18. 274 Fed. 86 (C. C. A. 6th, i921).
19. 293 Fed. 187 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923).
20. 72 F. (2d) 589 (C. C. A. ioth, 1934).
21. 276 U. S. 413 (1928).
22. Id. at 418. Italics added.
23. Id. at 423.
24. United States v. Eman Mfg. Co., 271 Fed. 353 (D. C. Colo. 192o); St. Clair
v. United States, 17 F. (2d) 886 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927).
25. 20 F. (2d) i6o, 162 (D. C. Neb. 1927).
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not hearsay and is admissible

26

in evidence. While most courts do not

mention the motive which prompted the defendant to commit the crime
as a factor, others make his innocence or guilt depend on it.27 When,
however, the character of overtures used by the officer fails to come
within the magic word which, being current in the jurisdiction, makes
available this defense, if the facts of the case are such as to excite sufficient pity of the court for the defendant, or sufficient indignation at
the acts of the officer, the defendant may nevertheless be held entitled
to an acquittal on the ground of "public policy," or the necessity of
protecting "the purity of government and its processes," 28 or because
any such conduct in a civil action would be held to have been a "violation of the decencies of life" 29 and to be in "disregard of the rules
.
. which formulate the ethics of men's relation to each other." 80

Judges have not been silent with regard to the unsatisfactory state
of the law concerning entrapment. Judge Learned Hand in United
States v. Becker says, "The decisions are plentiful, but the judges generally content themselves with deciding the case upon the evidence before them; we have been unable to extract from them any definite
doctrine, and it seems unprofitable once more merely to catalogue the
citations"; 3 1 and Judge Woodrough in United States v. Washington
says in regard to the doctrine, "being based on no statute and developed
without sanction or encouragement by the Supreme Court the most this
court can do is to declare how the doctrine will be applied in the instant
case and others like it on this docket. . . I adhere to my opinion that
the general question is political and not judicial." 32
Though the Supreme Court of the United States had adverted to
the doctrine of entrapment in an earlier case,38 the first case in which
it had occasion to determine its validity, the reasons on which the
doctrine is based, and the procedure applicable thereto did not reach
that court until I932. 84 The doctrine, as evolved by the lower federal
courts, is defined in this case as follows: "Entrapment is the conception
and planning of an offense by an officer and his procurement of its
commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the
trickery, persuasion or fraud of the officer. Federal and state courts
have held that substantial proof of entrapment as thus defined calls
26. Strader v. United States, 72 F. (2d) 589 (C. C. A. ioth, 1934).

27. Wall v. United States, 65 F. (2d) 993 (C. C. A. 5th, .1933). See also Hunter
v. United States, 6z F. (2d) 217 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932).
28. Roberts, J., in Sorrels v. United States, 287 U. S. 435, 453 (1932).
29. Ibid.
3o. Ibid.
31. 62 F. (2d) lOO7, ioO8 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
32.-2o F. (2d) i6o, 161 (D. C. Neb. 1927).
33. Casey v. United States, 276 U. S. 413 (1928).,
34. Sorrells v. United States, "87 U. S. 435 (1932).
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for submission of the issue to the jury and warrants an acquittal." 35
The counterpart of the doctrine is thus stated: "the forces of prevention and detection may use traps, decoys, and deception to obtain
evidence of the commission of crime. Resort to such means does not
render an indictment found a nullity nor call for the exclusion of evidence so procured." 81
The typical factual situation in cases involving entrapment is that
the officer, suspecting that the defendant has been engaged in some
illegal practice, e. g., in the illegal sale of liquor or in sending obscene
matter through the mails, approaches the defendant and offers to buy
liquor from him, or sends a decoy letter to him requesting him to mail
the obscene matter to the writer. The defendant, ignorant that the
solicitor is an officer, sells him the liquor, or mails to him the matter
requested. The defendant is then indicted and placed on trial for the
offense which he was thus induced to commit.
In the application of the doctrine stated above, there seems to be
a strange confusion of thought. When it is said that the defendant
is entitled to an acquittal if the offense was conceived and planned by
the officer, of what "offense" is the court speaking? Presumably the
offense for which the defendant is on trial. But in practically every
case of entrapment that offense was "conceived" and "planned" by the
officer; that offense, that sale, that mailing, would never have taken
place if the officer had not conceived it, planned it and instigated it, for
the defendant was unaware even of the existence of the officer before
the latter approached him, and therefore could not have "planned" or
had the "conception" of dealing with him.
Proof that the conception and planning of the offense was that of
the officer is not, however, alone, according to the formula, sufficient to
prove entrapment. It must also appear that the defendant would not
have committed the offense "except for the trickery, persuasion, or
fraud of the officer." 3 What has been said above applies equally to
this statement. Of what "offense" is the court speaking? The defendant may have committed similar offenses in the past, but he is not on
trial for those; or he might have committed an offense similar to the one
for which he is on trial if the officer had not decoyed him into this one,
but neither is he on trial for such as yet uncommitted offense. "The
offense" for which he is on trial, however, would certainly not have been
committed by him if it had not been "conceived and planned" by the
soliciting officer; certainly there was no proof in any of the cases that it
would have been committed without such conception and planning.
35. Id. at 454.
36. Id. at 453-454.

37. Id. at 454.
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Therefore, since in all of the cases in which entrapment has been interposed as a defense the crime for which the defendant was being tried
was "conceived and planned" by an officer, and also since the defendant
would not have committed it "except for the trickery, persuasion or
fraud of the officer", the defendant could never be convicted; yet, as a
matter of fact, under the doctrine as stated the cases in which the
defense has been allowed are comparatively few. Apparently what the
courts have in mind in making the supposed fact that the defendant
would not have committed the offense except for the trickery, fraud or
persuasion of the officer an element of this defense, seems to be, not that
he would not have committed the crime for which he was on trial if
he had not been tempted to it by the officer, but that it did not appear
that he had previously been engaged in committing crimes of a similar
character. It is not clear, however, why this should be a consideration,
38
even if it were admissible in evidence, which it would seem not to be.
It is a strange doctrine, that would make the guilt or innocence of an
accused or his liability to punishment depend not on proof that he
committed the offense charged, but on whether or not he had also committed other offenses of a similar character, or on a supposed fact that
he would not have committed the one charged if he had not been
tempted to do so (which fact is impossible of ascertainment), for the
fact, even if proved, that he had committed similar crimes furnishes no
proof that he would continue to commit them indefinitely. Even the
criminal law knows the phrase locus poenitentiae.
Leaving the doctrine itself and coming to the ground on which it
is based, one finds the decisions equally unsatisfactory. Most of the
cases state no basis for the doctrine, merely saying that the defendant
is entitled to an acquittal because he was "entrapped". The cases in
which a rationalization is attempted differ widely as to the reasons on
which the doctrine is founded. It was hoped, when the case of Sorrells
v. United States reached the Supreme Court, that there would be an
agreement on all phases of the doctrine-its validity, the reasons on
which it is founded, and the procedure involved. In the minority
opinion in the case, it was said, "the present case affords the opportunity to settle these matters as respects the administration of the federal criminal law." 39 Unfortunately, not only did members of the
Court differ sharply with regard to the procedure, but also with regard
38. Evidence of the commission of other crimes by the defendant is sometimes
admissible in criminal cases but generally only when it tends to prove some element of
the crime such as that the proven act was not done by the accused or that the act was
inadvertent, or not done with the necessary malice, knowledge, intent, or other mental
state essential. In the entrapment cases all elements of the crime have been proved
directly, or are admitted.
39. 287 U. S. 435, 454 (1932)-
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to the reasons on which both the procedure and the doctrine was based,
and even on the existence of the doctrine itself. The facts involved
in this case were typical. The offense charged was the illegal sale of
liquor. The officer, a prohibition agent, visited the defendant's house
with three other persons and was introduced by them as a furniture
dealer. After some conversation, the agent asked the defendant to
get him some liquor, stating that he wished to take it to his partner in
Charlotte. Defendant at first denied that he had any liquor; but after
further conversation, in the course of which the agent several times
asked defendant to get liquor for him, and in which it developed that
defendant and the agent had been soldiers in the same army division in
the World War, defendant left, and in a few minutes returned with
one half gallon of liquor which he sold to the agent for five dollars.
The defendant was later indicted and tried for the illegal possession and
sale of the liquor. He did not take the stand, but introduced a number
of witnesses who testified that he was a man of good character. The
government, in rebuttal, introduced testimony to the effect that defendant bore the reputation of being a rum-runner. Evidence was also
introduced, over defendant's objection, that about six weeks after this
sale, defendant at his home sold half a gallon of liquor to the same and
another agent.40 The agents' object in soliciting the sale was the prosecution of the defendant. The trial judge ruled that as a "matter of
law" there was no entrapment, and refused to submit the issue of
entrapment to the jury. A verdict of guilty followed. The Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. A writ of certiorari was
granted by the Supreme Court, limited to the question of whether the
evidence on the issue of entrapment was sufficient to go to the jury.
In order to decide this question, the Supreme Court found it necessary
to consider the ground on which the defense of entrapment is founded.
The Chief Justice, speaking for the majority of the Court, reversed the judgment and remanded the case saying, "We are of the
opinion that upon the evidence produced in the instant case the defense
of entrapment was available and that the trial court was in error in
holding that as a matter of law there was no entrapment, and in refusing to submit the issue to the jury." 41 While the portion of the opinion
just quoted states that under the evidence the "defense of entrapment
was available," the remainder of the opinion is devoted to showing that
there does not exist and cannot exist, either in the instant, or in any
other case, a defense of entrapment.
40. This statement of facts is from the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals,
Sorrells v. United States, 57 F. (2d) 973 (C. C. A. 4th, i932).
41. 287 U. S. 435, 452 (1932).
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The Court rests its decision, reversing the conviction, on the
ground that Congress, in enacting the prohibition statute, did not intend
it to apply to cases in which an officer instigated the sale of the liquor.
This is, of course, to hold that the defendant in selling the liquor committed no crime; and it is of the essence of the doctrine of entrapment
that the defendant committed the crime charged. It is only when that
has been proved that resort is had to the defense of entrapment.
This denial of the existence of the doctrine is made clear by a
further statement of the Court: "We are unable to approve the view
that the court, although treating the statute as applicable despite the
entrapment, and the defendant as guilty, has authority to grant immunity or to adopt a procedure to that end." 42 Again, it is said: "when
defendant has been duly indicted for an offense found to be within the
statute, and the proper authorities seek to proceed with the prosecution,
the court cannot refuse to try the case in the constitutional method because it desires to let the defendant go free." 43 And again, denying
the validity of analogues from civil cases, occurs the statement, "in a
criminal prosecution, the statute defining the offense is necessarily the
law of the case." 44
The minority opinion characterizes the opinion of the Court as "a
new method of rationalizing the defense of entrapment." It does more
than rationalize it: it denies its existence. It is not an application of
that doctrine, but the applica'tion of another-the most fundamental of
the criminal law, namely, that one shall not be convicted of a crime
when the act done by him was not unlawful-for if the statute did not
apply to the facts of the case, the defendant was privileged to sell liquor
to the officer and hence his act in so doing was not unlawful. This
view, that the most flagrant abuse of authority by-an officer in instigating a crime furnishes no excuse if the crime is committed, is undoubtedly in accord with the general principles of the criminal law.
In the nature of things there can be no defense to a crime committed.
The so-called "defenses" of the criminal law are not defenses to crimes;
they do not furnish excuses for a crime which has been committed; if
established, they disprove some necessary element of the crime charged
and hence negative the commission of the crime by the defendant.
"Alibi" when it is a "defense", is so when and because it proves that
the forbidden act was not done by the accused; "self defense", "defense
of others", or "of property", or in "prevention of crime" are defenses
when they show that the act done was one privileged under the law;
and "compulsion", because the act was not done of the will of the
42. Id. at 448.
43. Id. at 450.
44. Ibid.

THE DOCTRINE OF ENTRAPMENT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 255

accused. 45 "Infancy", "insanity" and "intoxication", are defenses
when they show incapacity, or, like "mistake of law", "of fact", or
"consent", when they disprove some necessary mental element of the
crime charged, such as malice or intent. The other "defenses" such as
"autre-fois acquit", "autre-fois convict", and "pardon" are not defenses
to a crime but bars to a second conviction for a crime of .which the
accused has already either been acquitted or convicted. The defense
based on laches of the state in prosecuting did not exist at common law.
The principle at common law is: "time does not run against the state."
The defense of entrapment, if it is a defense, is, therefore, sii generis.
It is not pleaded against a second conviction but against a first. It
excuses the defendant though his will was free and the act and mental
state necessary to constitute the crime charged have been abundantly
proved against him. It would seem, therefore, that the court was on
solid ground in repudiating the doctrine of entrapment, a necessary
element of that doctrine being that the defendant has committed the
crime with which he is charged.
It might be thought that the view of the majority of the
Court in this case, while it denies the existence of the doctrine of
entrapment as a defense, serves the same purpose, that of excusing a defendant for an act, knowingly done by him, expressly forbidden by a statute, on the ground that the legislature did not intend
the statute to apply to cases in which it appeared that the forbidden
act was done at the instigation of an officer. But this is not true. All
that the case decides is that the particular prohibition statute involved
does not apply to defendants who were entrapped into violating its
provisions. It furnishes no rule with regard to a person "entrapped"
into violations of statutes forbidding the possession or sale of narcotics
or poisons, sales by short weights and measures, the sending of obscene
matter through the mails, using the mails to defraud, or the score of
other prohibitory statutes for the violation of which the courts prior
to Sorrells v. United States excused defendants under the doctrine of
entrapment. Is a defendant hereafter indicted for violation of the
statute prohibiting the sales of opium, as well as one indicted under the
Prohibition Act, to be excused on the ground that the statute prohibiting the sale of opium was not intended by Congress to apply to sales
made at the instigation of an officer? Prior to the Sorrells case, the
court would have held that a sale of opium instigated by an officer was
within the doctrine of entrapment. That doctrine is now no longer in
45. "No man can be guilty of a crime without the will and intention of his mind.
It must be voluntary." Lord Mansfield, in Proceedings against Stratton, 21 How.
St. Tr. lO46, 1223 (1779).
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existence; the defendant can be excused only if it is held that Congress
in enacting the statute against the sale of opium intended it not to apply
to sales instigated by an officer.
In the case of Balint v. United States 46 the statute prohibiting
the sale of opium was under consideration. In an opinion delivered
by Chief Justice Taft, it was held that Congress intended the statute
to apply to the case of a sale made by one who did not know that
the article he sold was opium. Unless a court is to hold that though
Congress intended the statute to apply to a sale inadvertently made,
it did not intend it to apply to a sale intentionally made through
instigation by an officer, the reasoning of the Sorrells case will not
reach the same result as would the application of the doctrine of
entrapment. That the conclusion arrived at in the Sorrells decision is
not to be applied to every case in which the alleged offense was instigated by an officer, is shown by the statement of the Court that "The
conclusion we have reached upon those grounds carries its own limitations. We are dealing with a statutory prohibition and we are simply
concerned to ascertain whether in the light of a plain pullic policy and
of the proper administration of justice, conduct induced as stated should
be deemed to be within that prohibition. We have no occasion to consider hypothetical cases of crimes so heinous or revolting that the
applicable law would admit of no exceptions. No such situation is
presented here. The question in each case must be determined by the
scope of the law considered in the light of what may fairly be deemed
to be its object."

47

The Court, justifying its reading into the statute the unexpressed
exception that it shall not apply to cases of entrapment, says, "Literal
interpretation of statutes at the expense of the reason of the law and
producing absurd consequences or flagrant injustice has frequently
been condemned," 48 and cites several cases as precedents-none, however, involving entrapment. It quotes 4 9 from United States v. Kirby,
"General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead
to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence"; 50 and from United
States v. Katz, 51 "general terms descriptive of a class of persons made
subject to a criminal statute may and should be limited where the literal
application of the statute would lead to extreme or absurd results, and
where the legislative purpose gathered from the whole Act would be
46.
47.
48.
49.

258 U. S. 250 (1922).
287 U. S. 435, 450 (1932). Italics added.
Id. at 446.
Id. at 447.
50. 7 Wall. 482, 486 (U. S. 1868).
51. 271 U. S. 354, 362 (1926).
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satisfied by a more limited interpretation," 52 ;'
and "to the same effect,"
5
from a number of other cases. 3

While courts do occasionally read into criminal statutes a provision
the effect of which is to make the statute inapplicable to a case when
the facts of that case are within its expressed terms, it is difficult to
see how any of the decisions cited-in none of which the defendant
knowingly violated the provisions of the statutes under which he was
indicted--or the governing principles of those decisions, apply to cases
of "entrapment" in which a person, sui juris,who knows of the statute,
believes that it applies to him, is unaware that he is dealing with an
officer, and is under no compulsion or necessity or infirmity of reason,
deliberately violates the law. The reasons given in the majority opinion
for reading an unexpressed exception into the statute involved in the
Sorrells case, would apply with greater force to many statutes to which
no exceptions are allowed by the courts. The injustice involved in
applying the statute in the Sorrells case would certainly be less than in
the cases in which the accused did not know, and could not know, of
the existence of the statute he violated; yet in those cases the courts
have no hesitation in saying, notwithstanding the "hardship" and
"injustice" resulting, that "ignorance of the law is no excuse". The
same is true of that large class of cases in which the accused with
innocent mind brought himself within the literal terms of a statute
through non-negligent ignorance of some essential fact.
Chief Justice Taft said, in such a case, involving a sale of opium,
"its manifest purpose [of the statute] is to require every person dealing
in drugs to ascertain at his peril whether that which he sells comes
within the inhibition of the statute, and if he sells the inhibited drug
in ignorance of its character, to penalize him." 54 He recognizes also
that Congress may realize that injustice may follow the application of
a statute and still intend it to apply, notwithstanding the injustice, by
saying, "Congress weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an innocent seller to a penalty against the evil of exposing innocent purchasers
to danger from the drug and concluded that the latter was the result
preferably to be avoided." 55 In Rosen v. United States5 6 the defendant was indicted for mailing obscene matter. To his defense that he
52. 287

U. S. 435, 447 (1932)7

53. Id. at 448. An argument to show that Congress did not intend the statute to
apply to cases in which an officer entrapped the defendant to violate it might be made
on the ground that as Congress was presumably aware that the courts excused entrapped defendants and did not expressly provide that the statute should apply in such
cases, it intended it should, not apply. This argument is, however, so obvious that the
fact that the Court ignored it would seem to show that the Court did not consider it
valid, particularly since the Court based its holding on other grounds.
54. United States v. Balint, 258 U. S.250, 254 (1922).

55. Ibid.

56. 16i U. S.29 (896).
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did not know the matter he mailed was obscene, the Court said, "Con-

gress did not intend that the question as to the character of the paper
should depend upon the opinion or belief of the person who, with
knowledge or notice of its contents, assumed the responsibility of putting it in the mails of the United States." -7
Furthermore it must be asked, what are the limits, if any, to the
class of prohibitions into which the Court will read an exception because
of entrapment? The minority in the Sorrells case said, "no guide or
rule is announced as to when a statute shall be read as excluding a case
of entrapment, and no principle of statutory construction is suggested
which would enable us to say that it is excluded by some statutes and
not by others." 58 The position of the majority was that "The question
in each case must be determined by the scope of the law considered in
the light of what may fairly be deemed to be its object." 59 If this is
to be the test, what of such cases as Grimm v. United States, 60 Rosen v.
United States,61 and Price v. United States? 62 In the Grimm case an
inspector of the Government, suspecting that the defendant was engaged
in the business of dealing in obscene pictures, wrote to the defendant
asking him how many "fancy photographs" the latter could furnish
him, and saying the writer would send him a trial order. Upon receiving an answer stating that defendant could supply such pictures, the
inspector sent the latter an order for them. On those facts the defendant was tried and convicted under a statute making it unlawful to give
information by mail where, how, or by whom such pictures could be
obtained. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The Grimm
case was approved and followed, on similar facts, in the Rosen case.
In Price v. United States,63 in which obscene matter was mailed in
response to several decoy letters written by a Government inspector,
the Supreme Court again held that entrapment was no defense. On
what ground can it be said that Congress intended the statute to apply
to the acts of Grimm and Price who violated the statute under which
they were indicted on the solicitation of the officer and not to the act
of Sorrels who, on like solicitation, violated the statute under which he
was indicted? There seem to be no such differences in the "objects of
the law," or in the "absurdity of the results" that would follow its
application which are "foreign to the legislative purpose," or entailing
"flagrant injustice" in these cases that would indicate that Congress
57. Id. at 41.
58. 287 U. S. 435, 457 (1932).

59. Id. at 451.
6o. 156 U. S. 604 (895).
61. 161 U. S. 29 (1896).
(1897).
62. 165 U. S. 31

63. fIbd.
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intended the statute to apply in these three cases and not in the Sorrells
case.
After all, the "object of the law" created by all criminal statutes
is to prevent (by punishing those who violate their provisions) the conduct forbidden by them, whether the statute is directed against the sale
of liquor, against homicide, larceny or the sale of opium.
If the injustice or absurdity resulting from the application of the
provisions of a statute in entrapment cases is to be the test of the applicability of the statute, what of cases in which the acts of the officer are
described by some word which in a particular jurisdiction does not
entitle the defendant to an acquittal? Is the Sorrells case a mandate to
the lower federal courts to free the defendant if they think a conviction
would be unjust or absurd irrespective of the character of the overtures? If this is true, the present confusion is likely to become more
confounded.
Prior to the Sorrells case there was one source of conflict, namely,
was the defendant "entrapped"; now there are two sources: first, was
the defendant entrapped; second, did Congress intend the particular
statute on which the defendant was indicted to apply to cases in which
the defendant was entrapped?
There has been, to date, no conflict in the decisions subsequent to
the Sorrells case solely because of the new doctrine announced in that
case; this however is for the reason that, strange to say, none of these
cases so much as refer to that doctrine. Though nine of these cases
involved statutes other than that involved in the Sorrells case, the courts
did not construe these statutes to determine whether Congress intended
them to apply in entrapment cases but rationalized their decisions on
the basis of the tests in vogue prior to the Sorrells case.
The minority opinion in the Sorrells case, while agreeing with the
majority that the defendant should not be convicted, denies in no uncertain terms what it characterizes as "this new method of rationalizing
the defense" of entrapment, adopted by the majority in granting immunity to the defendant on the ground that the statute did not apply.
"This amounts," says the minority, "to saying that one who with full
intent commits the act defined by law as an offense is nevertheless by
virtue of the unspoken and implied mandate of the statute to be ad64
judged not guilty by reason of someone else's improper conduct ...
to afford him as his right a defense founded not on the statute, but on
the court's view of what the legislature is assumed to have meant, is to
grant him unwarranted immunity." 65 The minority opinion denies
64. 287 U. S. 435, 456 (1932).

65. Id. at 458.
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that Congress did not intend the statute to apply to cases in which the
act of the defendant was instigated by an officer. "His [the defendant's] action, so induced," says the opinion, "none the less falls within
the letter of the law and renders him amenable to its penalties . . . his
act, coupled with his intent to do the act, brings him within the definition
of the law; he has no rights or equities by reason of his entrapment.
. . . We cannot escape this conclusion by saying that where need arises

the statute will be read as containing an implicit condition that it shall
not apply in the case of entrapment." 66 This is, of course, to say that
Congress did intend the statute to apply to cases of entrapment. Yet
the minority of the Court, like the majority, refuse to apply it; the
majority because they think Congress did not intend it to apply; the
minority because, though they think Congress did intend it to apply,
believe that they ought not to apply it.
If the defendant has committed the crime charged and is subject
to the penalties therefor, on what doctrine is he granted immunity, for
immunity he has if he is not to be convicted, and the minority also held
that convicted he should not be?
"The doctrine rests, rather," says the minority opinion, "on a
fundamental rule of public policy. The protection of its own functions
and the preservation of the purity of its own temple belongs only to the
court. It is the province of the court and of the court alone to protect
itself and the government from such prostitution of the criminal
law." 67
That courts should refuse to enforce a constitutional statute, within
the power of the legislature, and admittedly intended by the legislature
to apply to the facts of a given case because its enforcement would be
against public policy is a startling doctrine. Criminal statutes are
enacted for the very reason that the legislature deems the prohibited
conduct to be against public policy. To hold that the courts can set
them aside because their enforcement would violate public policy, is to
say either that Congress in enacting the statute was ignorant of the
rules of such policy, or, knowing them, intended to violate them. The
Supreme Court has heretofore invariably held that while the court had
the power to refuse to apply a law if in its opinion it was unconstitutional, it was not concerned with its effect on public policy; that Congress, not the court, was the proper judge of such matters.
In Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company v.
McGuire 68 the Court said, "The legislature, provided it acts within its
constitutional authority, is the arbiter of the public policy of the State.
66. Id. at 456.
67. Id. at 457.
68. 219 U. S. 549, 565 (1911).
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While the court, unaided by legislative declaration and applying the
principles of the common law, may uphold or condemn contracts in the
light of what is conceived to be public policy, its determination as a
rule for future action must yield to the legislative will when expressed
in accordance with the organic law."
"If the court may construe an act of Congress," says the minority
opinion in the Sorrells case, in controverting the opinion of the majority, "so as to create a defense for one whose guilt the act pronounces
no reason is apparent why the same statute may not be modified by a
similar process of construction as to the penalty prescribed. But it is
settled this may not be done. Ex parte United States, 242 U. S. 27." 69
By a parity of reasoning it would seem that if the court may refuse to
apply the admittedly applicable provisions of the statute because the
court thought that to apply it would be against public policy, no reason
is apparent why the court should not refuse to apply the penalty prescribed by the statute on the ground that it was too severe to be in
accordance with public policy. Heretofore the courts have refused to
do this so long as the penalty prescribed did not infringe the constitutional provision against cruel and unusual punishment.
The power of the courts would not end here. A statement of
Chief Justice White, quoted in the majority opinion, is to this effect:
"if it be that the plain legislative command fixing a specific punishment
for crime is subject to be permanently set aside by an implied judicial
power upon considerations extraneous to the legality of the conviction,
it would necessarily seem to follow that there could be likewise implied a
discretionary authority to permanently refuse to try a criminal case because of the conclusion that a particular act made criminal by law ought
not to be treated as criminal. And thus it would come to pass that the
possession by the judicial department of power permanently to refuse
to enforce a law would result in the destruction of the conceded powers
of the other departments and hence leave no law to be enforced." 70
It is the function of the legislative branch of the government to
determine, within the bounds of the Constitution, what acts are against
public policy, stigmatize them as crimes, and prescribe the penalty for
their commission; and as said by Judge Parker when this case was
before the circuit court, "there is no higher public policy than that all
men should obey the law." 71
The minority opinion states the doctrine of entrapment in criminal
law is the analogue of the same rule that in civil cases requires the
courts to refuse their aid to the perpetration and consummation of an
69. 287 U. S. 435, 458 (1932).

70. Id. at 449.
7. 57 F. (2d) 972, 977 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932).
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illegal scheme: "Invariably they hold a civil action must be abated if
its basis is violation of the decencies of life, disregard of the rules,
statutory or common law, which formulate the ethics of men's relations
to each other. Neither courts of equity nor those administering legal
remedies tolerate the use of their process to consummate a wrong." 72
The majority opinion answers this by pointing out that: "When courts
of law refuse to sustain alleged causes of action which grow out of
illegal schemes, the applicable law itself denies the right to recover.
Where courts of equity refuse equitable relief because complainants
come with unclean hands they are administering the principles of
equitable jurisprudence governing equitable rights. But in a criminal
prosecution, the statute defining the offense is necessarily the law of the
case." '3 A closer analogy than the equity rule would seem to be found
in the cases in which the Government seeks to convict by means of
evidence illegally obtained by an officer. In these cases, however, the
particular item of evidence is merely excluded; the illegal act of the
officer in obtaining it is not held to entitle the defendant to an acquittal.
The minority opinion, like the majority, places no limit on the
type of case which comes within the ambit of its doctrine. Indeed, it
says there is no such limit. The doctrine is equally applicable, says the
opinion, "whether the offense is one at common law or merely a creature
of statute. .

.

.

This view calls for no distinction between crimes

mala in se and statutory offenses of lesser gravity; requires no statutory
construction, and attributes no merit to a guilty defendant. .

.

."

This is indeed a broad statement of the doctrine of entrapment. The
phraseology would indicate that if a government detective suspecting a
person of previous murders should instigate a murder by him, should
stand by and see him commit it, the defendant would be entitled to an
acquittal. Would a court so hold? The writer has been unable to find
any case in which a court has held entrapment to be a defense, except
in indictments for statutory offenses. There are, it is true, many cases
of indictment for common law crimes induced by overtures of an officer
in which the court has held that the defendant was entitled to an
acquittal. These have been, however, indictments for such crimes as
larceny and burglary in which non-consent to the taking of the property
or to the entry into the dwelling is an essential element. While such
cases are treated in text books, and sometimes in the opinions of the
courts, as cases of entrapment, entrapment was not the ground of
acquittal. Entrapment assumes that the defendant committed the
offense with which he is charged; in the classes of cases above menU. S. 435, 454
73. Id. at 450.
74. Id. at 455.
72. 287

(1932.)
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tioned the defendant was held not guilty because the overtures of the
officer made, as they were, with the cooperation of the owner of the
property or of the dwelling, amounted to consent of the owner, and
hence disproved the element of non-consent necessary for a conviction
of the offense charged.
It is not surprising that the subject of entrapment should be in
confusion both as to the results of the cases and the grounds on which
they are decided. In truth there seems to be no rational basis for the
doctrine. Its origin is to be found in-the natural feeling, shared by
judges, that a person should not be made the victim of what Mr. Justice
Holmes called in speaking of evidence obtained by wire tapping by an
officer, "dirty business". 7 - There is scarcely a case sustaining the
defense of entrapment in which such words as "detestation", "indecent", "to be deplored", "intolerable" do not occur to describe the acts
of the officer in luring the defendant into the crime. Moved by this
detestation and, in a lesser degree, by sympathy for the "unwary",
"innocent" defendant, the courts have groped for some legal principle
on which to render nugatory the acts of the officer or to excuse the
entrapped defendant. Some have found it in estoppel; 76 some on the
ground that entrapment destroys the voluntary character of the defendant's act;

77

some on the ground of public policy. 78

The majority

opinion in Sorrells v. United States, repudiating all these grounds for
the doctrine, as well as the doctrine itself, offers a new method of
making effective this feeling of detestation and sympathy.
It suggests as a ground on which trial courts may still exercise
their sympathy for entrapped defendants and their desire to discourage
this practice, the possibility of excusing the defendant by holding that
he committed no crime because of the injustice or absurdity resulting
from applying the statute involved. In view of the vigorous and persuasive dissent from this view by Mr. Justice Roberts, Mr. Justice
Brandeis, and the present Chief Justice, and of the uncertainty and
conflict that will inevitably result from the differing views of judges
as to when, if ever, a conviction of a defendant who voluntarily violated the plain prohibitions of a known statute, would or would not be
unjust or absurd, it does not seem presumptuous to suggest that there
is another and more effective method by which this practice of "entrapment" may be stopped.
Certainly the whole practice, whether it consists in the mere "laying
of a trap or decoy" or of a scheme whereby the officer "conceives and
75. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 470 (1927).
76. United States v. Lynch, 256 Fed. 983 (S. D. N. Y. ig98).

77. Voves v. United States, 249 Fed. 1gi (C. C. A. 7th, 1918).
78. Ritter v. United States, 293 Fed. 187 (C.C. A. 9th, 1923).
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plans" the offense, is a "dirty business" and should be ended. Of
equal certainty, the method in use by the courts for sixty-three years,
that of acquitting guilty defendants in cases of the grosser form of
entrapment, has not ended even the practice in that grosser form.
It is sometimes stated in justification of the practice that an officer
may decoy a person to commit a crime as distinguished from conceiving
and planning it, that such activity is frequently essential to the enforcement of the law. 79 This is the argument formerly used for the employment of torture, and still used by detection officials to justify the
"third degree". If the detection agencies of government are able to
ferret out and bring to justice the perpetrators of really serious offenses
without resorting to the practice of tempting suspected persons to commit an additional one, why can they not resort to less questionable
methods to secure evidence of guilt in the class of the minor offenses
in which this practice of entrapment is employed?
As far as the accused, himself, is concerned, he seems not to be
deserving of more sympathy than many defendants, and less than some
who are frequently convicted in our courts without redress, as the
writer has attempted to show above. If the desire is to abate the practice of entrapment, a more effective method than the present one of
excusing the defendant whose moral guilt, and whose legal guilt of
violating the statute is clear, lies in the indictment and conviction of
the officer. A few such convictions and the practice of entrapment
would cease. There can be no doubt that under the principles of the
criminal law the officer in these cases is guilty of a crime. If a private
person solicits another to commit an offense, the former is guilty of
the crime of solicitation if the latter refuses to commit the offense
solicited, and as an accessory or principal to the offense if the other
commits the offense solicited. There is no reason why an officer should
not come within the same principle. That the officer has no legal authority to instigate the commission of a crime is shown by many statements of the courts and by the universal condemnation of such acts by
the courts. No other defense would seem to exist. No other element
of the offense is lacking; the act of solicitation is done; the knowledge
is present that the act solicited will, if done by the person solicited, be
a crime. It cannot be said that he did not have the "criminal intent";
he had the same intent that the solicitee has, namely, the intent that the
forbidden act be done, knowing that if it be done it will be a crime,
which is all the intent necessary for the offense of solicitation. The
officer could not defend on the ground that the motive prompting his
act was a good one. In the first place, it is universally held that the
79. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435, 44i (1932).
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fact that a defendant has a good motive in doing a forbidden act is no
excuse; and in the second place, it cannot be said that the motive of the
officer in inducing the defendant to commit the crime so that he may
be prosecuted is a good one when the courts not only universally condemn the conduct of the officer, but hold, as they do, that it is because
the solicitation was done with the motive of prosecution that the person
solicited should be excused.

